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Abstract
This paper extends the literature on the taxation of polluting exhaustible re-
sources by taking international heterogeneities and national tax-setting into account.
We propose a two-country Romer model of endogenous growth in which the South is
endowed with the stock of an essential polluting non-renewable resource and world
economic growth is driven by a northern research sector. We consider the stock of
pollution as affecting global welfare.
First, we characterize the optimal environmental taxation policies. Second, we
examine the impacts of national taxes. Their time profile determines the extraction
path, the dynamics of pollution accumulation and that of world output. Their re-
spective levels entail inter-country interactions by altering the efficiency of the world
resource allocation, the tax revenues and the resource rents. We study isolatedly
the distortional and distributional effects of local taxes. Then, we completely as-
sess their overall impacts, shedding light on the divergent interests of heterogeneous
regions regarding their national environmental taxes.
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1 Introduction
A current challenge for environmental economists is to advocate instruments to reduce
the impact of climate change. Due to the global character of this phenomenon, whatever
are the chosen instruments, participation of a large group of countries will be needed to
implement an efficient policy. Hence, a particular aspect of economic instruments that de-
serves major attention is their international impacts. This paper aims at examining these
impacts of taxes on the use of polluting non-renewable resources. This issue proves to be
of a particular relevance when countries are heterogeneous along one or more dimensions.
A large literature investigates the optimal taxation of these resources. The first stud-
ies (in the 1990s) used partial equilibrium models of an exhaustible resource depletion
where the flow of resource fills a stock of pollution. The optimal dynamics of depletion in
presence of climate change was computed and compared to that in the absence of climate
change by Withagen [26]. Sinclair [22], Ulph and Ulph [25] and Hoel and Kverndokk [13]
analyzed the impacts of a carbon tax on the decentralized equilibrium and characterized
the optimal tax schemes correcting the environmental distortion. More recently (in the
2000s), this issue has been addressed in dynamic general equilibrium, still one-country,
models of endogenous growth. As a first step, some authors considered the flow of pollu-
tion from the resource consumption to be harmful (Schou [20] and [21], and Grimaud and
Rougé [10]). A substantial theoretical improvement has been done by modeling pollution
as in the partial equilibrium literature above, i.e. by assuming the stock of atmospheric
pollution to have negative effects on the economy. Groth and Schou [12] and Grimaud
and Rougé [11] represent this new generation of analytical studies. Overall, this literature
highlights the requirement of a dynamic framework under perfect anticipations and of the
explicit consideration of the resource exhaustibility (On this, see also Belgodere [3]). It
then emphasizes the particular role of the time profile of the environmental tax rate. Pre-
cisely, extraction under laissez faire is shown to be faster than optimally, this distortion
being corrected by a decreasing ad valorem tax on the resource use. This optimal policy
fosters growth and slows down resource depletion.
On the one hand, these contributions are particularly relevant to address climate
change. Indeed, it is now well known that carbon dioxide is the main anthropogenic
greenhouse gas1 and that a very large part of its emissions is due to combustion of
exhaustible fossil fuels2.
On the other hand, only aggregated models, representing a homogeneous world, have
been used to study taxation of fossil fuels. However, the real world is very heterogeneous
with respect to oil endowments3, for example. Moreover, taxation of an exhaustible re-
source whose distribution among countries is heterogeneous entails inter-country transfers
and thus conflicting interests.
Indeed, exploitation of a non-renewable resource generates pure rents that, as such,
are partly captured through a tax on the resource (e.g. Dasgupta and Heal [7], Sinn [23]
and Gaudet and Lasserre [9]): independently of the effect of the tax on the extraction
path, it shifts much of the tax burden to the resource owners. Bergstrom [4] and Brander
1Carbon dioxide from energy represents 95% of the energy-related greenhouse gas emissions and about
80% of the world anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions (Quadrelli and Peterson [18]).
2In 2004, fossil sources accounted for 81% of the global primary energy supply (Quadrelli and Peterson
[18]).
3Combustion of oil products generates 40% of the world carbon dioxide emissions; it is the most
important source of carbon dioxide emissions (Quadrelli and Peterson [18]). The 19 countries with the
largest crude oil reserves per capita represent more than 80% of the world reserves (source: Oil & Gas
Journal [17]).
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and Djajic [6]4 highlighted that national taxes on these resources can be used strategically
by resource consuming countries in order to extract the rents to be earned by the resource
producing countries. These interesting contributions suggest that taxation of exhaustible
resources, when their distribution is heterogeneous, is an international issue that must
be addressed in a multi-country model.
The objective of this paper is to study the taxation of a polluting non-renewable
resource in an international, heterogeneous framework. To this purpose, we simply di-
vide into two regions a canonical  in the sense of the analytical literature cited above
 endogenous growth model of climate change where the combustion of an exhaustible
resource generates emissions accumulating into a world stock of pollution, representing
the greenhouse effect. Moreover, because potential conflicting interests would arise from
the different characteristics of countries, we take advantage of the two-country model to
introduce realistic international heterogeneities. A surprising difference between the top
oil producing and the top oil consuming countries is that the former are often poorer than
the latter5. As a result of this endowment heterogeneity and the related heterogeneity
in productivity levels throughout the world, the North largely consumes this resource,
while the South mainly exports it. We will then divide the world economy into two re-
gions: the North, representing the developed, top oil consuming countries, and the South,
representing the relatively low-productive, top oil producing countries. Consistently, we
also assume that world economic growth is driven by a northern research sector and that
intellectual property rights (IPRs for short) are not enforced in the South.
This North-South division raises some issues regarding the international effects of
regional environmental taxation and thus the possibility to solve a global problem with
local tax-setting. First, we shall see that every environmental taxation policy implies a
certain sharing of the world production. Second, in order to understand the benefit of one
country from modifying its local tax rate, one need to examine how such a deviation alters
the local tax revenues, relative competitiveness and the global efficiency of the polluting
resource allocation. Third, since regional taxes change the location of productive activities
and IPRs are not homogeneously enforced, the potential growth effect of environmental
taxation should also be addressed. Finally, national taxes set by environment-conscious
governments may solve a global environmental problem; however, if so, international
conflicting interests may lead to a non environmental distortion.
The inter-country effects these issues rely on can be expected to be of a substantial
magnitude. Indeed, although extremely heterogeneous, taxes on the use of fossil fuels
are very high in top oil consuming regions6, thus representing a large part of their fiscal
revenues7. Understanding these effects and drawing their policy implications is all the
more relevant as rising these taxes seem to be currently tempting for environmental and
fiscal reasons.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present our model and charac-
terize the associated socially optimum allocation. Section 3 describes the solution of the
decentralized equilibrium and examine qualitatively the effects of the time profile of the
environmental tax rates as well as those of the environmental tax levels. In particular, we
4These studies do not deal with the environment. See Amundsen and Schöb [1] for an introduction
in Bergstrom's model of a harmful flow of pollution.
5For instance, the per capita GNI over the 19 countries with the largest crude oil reserves per capita
is lower than 5800 US$ in 2005 (sources: The World Bank, Oil & Gas Journal [17]). The same year,
OECD represented 60% of the world oil consumption (source: EIA).
6On this, see Bacon [2] and IEA [14].
7Taxes on oil products constitute 6% of the total fiscal revenues of OECD member countries (Source:
IEA). The G7 countries made $517 billion per year through these taxes over the period 2003-2007 (See
OPEC [16]).
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examine the potential growth effect of the tax levels under heterogeneous IPRs enforce-
ment. In the same section, the optimal environmental taxation is determined. The results
of Sections 2 and 3 are generalizations of those obtained in the literature on taxation of
polluting exhaustible resources to the case of a multi-country world. These extensions
emphasize the need that countries coordinate their environmental taxation policies. Sec-
tion 4 studies the effects of the national tax levels on the output and consumption in
the two countries and on the global efficiency of the resource allocation. We examine
isolatedly a distributional rent transfer effect and a locational efficiency effect. Next, we
compute the total impact of an increase in the northern environmental tax level. Finally,
we shed light on the strategic interests of both countries in setting their environmental
taxes at a lower or a greater rate, depending on their characteristics.
2 Model and Welfare
2.1 Model
At each date t ∈ [0,+∞), the final output is produced in both countries using the range
of available intermediate goods, labor and a flow of resource. The aggregate production
functions are8
Yi =
(∫ Ai
0
xi(j)
α dj
)
LYi
β
Ri
γ, α+ β + γ = 1, i = N,S, (2.1)
where xi(j) is the amount used of intermediate good j, L
Y
i is the quantity of labor
employed in the production sector, Ri is the quantity of natural resource burnt in country
i. The subscripts N and S refer respectively to the North and the South.
Ai, i = N,S, is an index of technological development which measures the range of the
available innovations in each country. Only the North is engaged in a research activity.
The derivative of a variable X with respect to time being denoted by X˙, the production
of innovations writes
A˙N = ψANL
A
N , ψ > 0, (2.2)
where LAN is the quantity of labor employed in the research sector. A constant fraction
φ, 0 < φ ≤ 1, of the ever discovered innovations diffuses naturally to the South while the
remaining ones cannot be used in this country:
AS = φAN , 0 < φ ≤ 1. (2.3)
φ can be interpreted as an index of southern development.
To each available innovation is associated an intermediate good produced in both
countries through a one-for-one technology from the final output:
xi(j) = yi(j), j ∈ [0, Ai], i = N,S. (2.4)
The resource is freely extracted from a finite initial stock (Q):
Q˙ = −R = −(RN +RS), Q(0) = Q0 > 0, given, (2.5)
and its use results in a proportional flow of pollution emptying a stock of environment
quality (E)9:
E˙ = −hR = −h(RN +RS), h > 0, E(0) = E0 > hQ0, given. (2.6)
8For simplicity, the time argument of each variable is dropped as long as this does not create ambiguity.
9Following Groth and Schou [12], we ignore the regeneration ability of the atmosphere. This is for
simplicity since, from a control theoretic point of view, this definition of the level of environmental quality
reduces the problem by one state variable. However, all our results are robust to the introduction of a
linear auto-regeneration process.
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Each household is endowed with one unit of labor. The total quantities of labor in
North and South respectively are locally fixed and constant over time:
LYN + L
A
N ≤ LN , (2.7)
LYS ≤ LS. (2.8)
The households of both countries consume the amount of the final good remaining
after the production of the intermediates so that the world level of consumption, C, must
satisfy the world's constraint on the use of the final good:
CN + CS +
∫ AN
0
xN(j) dj +
∫ AS
0
xS(j) dj ≤ YN + YS. (2.9)
The preferences of the infinitely-lived representative households of North and South
are identical and represented by the utility functions
Ui =
∫ +∞
0
ln
(Ci
Li
Eλ
)
e−ρt dt, i = N,S, λ, ρ > 0, (2.10)
where λ is an index of environmental concern and ρ the psychological discount rate.
2.2 Welfare
Let us characterize the Pareto optima of this economy. They are the solutions of the
weighted utilitarian social planner's programm. This programm consists in maximizing∫ +∞
0
[
δLN ln
(CN
LN
Eλ
)
+ (1− δ)LS ln
(CS
LS
Eλ
)]
e−ρt dt, 0 < δ < 1. (2.11)
subject to equations (2.1) to (2.9) with respect to Ci, xi, Ri, L
Y
i and L
A
N , i = N,S.
The results are formally given in Appendix A. Using these results and the phase
diagram of Figure 1, we fully describe the optimal dynamics of the economy. The main
findings are summarized in Proposition 1. The growth rate of any variable X is denoted
by gX . We define global variables as follows: Y = YN + YS, C = CN +CS, R = RN +RS
and x = xN + xS while AN = A and AS = φA. The upper-script o is used for optimum.
Proposition 1 In the Pareto set:
ı) LYN
o
and LAN
o
= LN − LYNo immediately jump to constant values. Thus, gAoN = gAoS =
gAo = ψL
A
N
o
is always constant. The relative output,
Y oN (t)
Y oS (t)
, is constant over time and is
a decreasing function of the index of southern productivity, φ. The relative consumption
level,
CoN (t)/LN
CoS(t)/LS
, is constant over time and is an increasing function of the relative weight
of the North in the social welfare function, δ.
ıı) If households are indifferent to the environmental quality (λ = 0), the economy imme-
diately jumps to its steady-state, in which
gRoN = gRoS = gRo = −ρ
gCoN = gCoS = gCo = gY o = gY oN = gY oS = gAo − γρ1−α
gxoN = gxoS = gxo = − γρ1−α
.
ııı) In the case of environmental concern (λ > 0), the economy is always in transition
while converging towards the steady-state where pollution does not matter (λ = 0). The
flow of resource use decreases over time: −ρ < goR(t) < 0 and limt7→+∞ goR(t) = −ρ.
Hence, the resource is extracted and used slower than with no environmental concern.
The rates of growth of production and consumption levels, goY (t) and g
o
C(t), are also higher
in this case.
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Proof of Proposition 1 See Appendix A.
Let us give further details about these results.
First of all, note that, if households are indifferent to the environment, that is to say
if pollution is not harmful (λ = 0), the economy immediately jumps to its steady-state
and keeps growing regularly. Indeed, the growth rate of the stock of knowledge is always
constant and in case of no pollution concerns, the resource is optimally depleted at a
constant rate. Hence, the transitional dynamics of the model stems from the introduction
of the environmental issue.
Let us now examine the optimal dynamics of the economy. To do so, we construct
the phase diagram represented in Figure 1.
The optimal rate of extraction is shown in Appendix A to obey goR = −ρ − λ(1 −
α)goE/γ (equation (A.25)). Obviously, g
o
R is related to g
o
E since it internalizes the effect of
extracting and burning the resource R, on the environmental quality, E. This equation
is represented in Figure 1 by the straight line (HC). Differentiating (A.25) with respect
to time leads to g˙oR = −λ(1− α)g˙oE/γ. From this, let us note that if g˙oE ≥ 0 then g˙oR ≤ 0
and inversely.
From the definition of pollution (2.6), E˙o = −hRo, one gets goE = −hRo/Eo. Log-
differentiating with respect to time leads to g˙oE/g
o
E = g
o
R − goE, i.e. g˙oE = goE(goR − goE).
This equation and the fact that goE < 0 imply that, if g
o
R ≥ goE, then g˙oE ≤ 0, and thus
g˙oR ≥ 0. Inversely, if goE ≥ goR, then g˙oE ≥ 0 and g˙oR ≤ 0. This gives the dynamics of goR
and goE on both sides of the gR = gE line in Figure 1.
Before studying the phase diagram, we need to make two remarks. First, the flow of
resource extraction is strictly positive at every date t ≥ 0. Indeed, the resource is essential
in the sense that the marginal productivity of the resource gets infinite as the resource
use goes to 0, (limR 7→0 ∂Y/∂R = +∞), and marginal utility gets infinite as consumption
goes to 0 (limCi 7→0 ∂Ui/∂Ci = +∞, i = N,S). Hence, R(t) > 0 for all t ≥ 0.
Second, the stock of the resource is completely depleted asymptotically. Indeed, each
unit of resource consumed in the production process at any date can be used in such a
way that it improves welfare. Its effect on utility is twofold. First, it allows an increase
in consumption. Second, it increases the stock of pollution, thus being harmful from
the date of its use on. The former positive effect can be marginally infinite due to the
essentiality of the resource. However, due to the finite amount of resource, and thus
the finiteness of the stock of pollution, and the continuity of damages in this stock, the
latter effect is bounded: the marginal disutility of extraction at any date t ≥ 0, and thus
of pollution, formally writes
∫ +∞
t
(δLN + (1 − δ)LS)λ(1/E(s))(∂E(s)/∂R(t))e−ρ(s−t) ds,
where ∂E(s)/∂R(t) = −h as s ≥ t and 1/E(s) < 1/(E0 − hQ0) since E0 − hQ0 is the
positive lower bound of the environmental quality, reached after the polluting resource
is fully exhausted. Hence, by spreading enough the use of the resource over time, more
resource can be depleted in a utility improving way. Technically, this is to say that the
costate variable associated to the exhaustibility constraint on the polluting resource (µQ
in Appendix A) is strictly positive, thus meaning that the social value of each unit of
resource is strictly positive.
Let us now study the phase diagram depicted in Figure 1. There are two steady-states,
SS1 and SS2. SS1 is unstable. Along this steady-state, E˙ is always strictly negative,
even asymptotically. This would imply, by (2.6), that R is always strictly positive, even
asymptotically. Since this contradicts limt7→+∞R(t) = 0, this path can be ruled out.
The divergence along (HC) towards a positive rate of extraction can also be ruled out.
Indeed, a positive gR would lead to an exhaustion in finite time. This would contradicts
what is stated above.
Steady-state SS2 is stable. It is the path of the economy along which optimal extrac-
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tion, Ro, and thus pollution, E˙o, tend to 0. It corresponds to the case of the absence of
pollution (λ = 0). Therefore, it will also be the "laissez-faire" equilibrium, when environ-
ment is not internalized. We shall see it later in Subsection 3.2. The economy converges
towards this path along the part of (HC) which is below SS1.
It is worth noting how evolve the main variables along this transition. The optimal
growth rate of extraction, goR, decreases over time and converges to its lower bound, −ρ.
It means that this rate is always greater than without pollution. It also means that the
introduction of pollution in the economy renders desirable to extract the resource more
slowly. This is consistent with the findings of Withagen [26] and Grimaud and Rougé
[11].
Environmental quality decreases unambiguously over time, goE being negative, and
reach asymptotically its lower limit, goE converging to 0. Hence, the environmental quality
decays slower and slower.
The dynamics of output is driven by both that of the resource extraction and that of
the innovation side of the model. On the one hand, the allocation of labor being stable
over time, the quantity of labor used in the production process, the stock of knowledge
and the number of intermediates grow at constant rates. On the other hand, the use of
the resource is not regular but asymptotically. Consistently, output grows faster along
the transition than along the asymptotic steady-state.
Eventually, Proposition 1 emphasizes the continuum of Pareto optima depending on
how is shared the output between the two countries. In our social planning approach, this
will depend on how the planner weights both groups of households. Beyond the study
of how to design policies to implement a social optimum in a decentralized economy, our
two-country approach helps investigate how these policies affect the split of the output
between North and South and thus their relative benefits from these policies.
The results about the optimal depletion of the resource and the path of pollution accu-
mulation are consistent with the findings of the literature mentioned in the Introduction.
Proposition 1 then offers a generalization of these results to the case of a two-country
7
economy.
3 Decentralized Equilibrium for Given National Taxes
Given our examination of the optimal dynamics, we can characterize, in a decentralized
model, the optimal taxation policy in the presence of a pollution externality. Moreover,
this decentralized approach will render possible to investigate the effects of the national
environmental taxes on the general equilibrium outcome.
On the one hand, we follow the literature regarding the basic assumptions relative to
the growth engine, to the nature of the goods and to the markets' structures. Endogenous
growth is modeled à la Romer and is driven by northern research. The final good, the
intermediate goods and the extracted resource are private and freely tradable across
countries. There is a world financial market10. The stock of atmospheric pollution is
a pure public bad. The final sectors, the research sector and the extraction sector are
perfectly competitive while the intermediate sector is monopolistic.
On the other hand, beyond the technological heterogeneities introduced in the previ-
ous section (international differences in labor productivities and countries' sizes), we can
introduce other heterogeneities in the decentralized two-country framework. We assume
that the southern households own the entire stock of the natural resource. Moreover,
intellectual property rights (IPRs for short) are perfectly enforced in the North while
they are not in the South.
The sources of inefficiency will thus be the standard public good character of knowl-
edge and pollution and the monopolistic structure of the northern intermediate sector.
Consistently, subsidies to the northern research sector and to the use of intermediates
will be sufficient instruments to solve the distortions about the suboptimal investment in
R&D. Furthermore, in order to solve the environmental problem, we assume the existence
of two national taxes on the local use of the polluting resource.
3.1 Agents' Behavior
The Northern Final Sector. In what follows, the final good is chosen to be the numeraire
of the economy and its price is normalized to unity.
The program of this sector consists in maximizing its profit,
( ∫ A
0
xN(j)
α dj
)
LYN
β
RN
γ−∫ A
0
pN(j)(1−sN)xN(j) dj−wNLYN−pR(1+θN)RN , with respect to all xN(j), LYN and RN .
In this expression, pN(j) is the unit price of intermediate good j, sN is the unit subsidy to
the use of intermediate goods in the North, wN is the wage rate in the North
11, pR is the
unit price of the extracted resource and θN > −1 is the unit ad valorem tax on the use
of the resource. The behavior of this sector is summarized by the first-order conditions
αxN(j)
α−1LYN
β
RN
γ = pN(j)(1− sN), j ∈ [0, A], (3.1)
β
YN
LYN
= wN , (3.2)
γ
YN
RN
= pRτN , (3.3)
10Thanks to the Walras law, we can as usually avoid computing the equilibrium on this market. The
details of the equilibrium on this market is available from the authors upon request.
11As the labor markets are segmented due to the fixity of this factor, there are two wages in the
economy.
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where12 τN = 1 + θN > 0.
The Southern Final Sector. The program of this sector is similar to that of the
northern final sector. However, there is no need of subsidy to the use of intermediate
goods in the South since, due to the absence of intellectual property enforcement, the
intermediate monopolists in competition with competitive pirates, are forced to sell their
output at marginal cost13.
The program of this sector is thus the maximization of
( ∫ φA
0
xS(j)
α dj
)
LYS
β
RS
γ −∫ φA
0
pS(j)xS(j) dj − wSLYS − pR(1 + θS)RS, with respect to all xS(j), LYS and RS. Here,
the variables introduced with a subscript S have the same meaning as those introduced
in the previous subsection but transposed to the South.
The behavior of this sector is summarized by the first-order conditions
αxS(j)
α−1LYS
β
RS
γ = pS(j), j ∈ [0, φA], (3.4)
β
YS
LYS
= wS, (3.5)
γ
YS
RS
= pRτS, (3.6)
where τS = 1 + θS > 0.
The Intermediate Sector. Each innovation is protected by a patent which gives rise
to a monopoly position in the intermediate sector. Note that since there is no IPRs
enforcement in the South, this monopoly cannot earn anything from its sales to the South.
Therefore, the profit of the jth monopolist is
(
pN(j)− 1
)
xN
(
pN(j)
)
, where xN
(
pN(j)
)
is
the demand for the intermediate good j by the northern final sector.
The price chosen by the monopoly in the North is
pN(j) =
1
α
, ∀j ∈ [0, A], (3.7)
which happens to be independent of j, while the intermediates are sold at their marginal
cost in the South14:
pS(j) = 1,∀j ∈ [0, φA]. (3.8)
As a result, the equilibrium is symmetric with respect to the quantities of intermediate
goods:
xN =
(α2LYNβRNγ
(1− sN)
) 1
1−α
, xS =
(
αLYS
β
RS
γ
) 1
1−α
. (3.9)
No profit is made on xS. The whole spot profit of an intermediate producer is made from
its sales to the North (xN):
piIG =
(1− α
α
)
xN . (3.10)
The Research Sector. The intermediate sector buys patents from the research sector
at their market value,
V (t) =
∫ +∞
t
piIG(s)e
− ∫ st r(u) du ds, (3.11)
12In what follows, for notational convenience, we may prefer to use the multiplicative rate τ than the
ad valorem rate θ.
13In other words, the optimal subsidy is zero. We will come back to this point in the next subsection.
14The northern monopolists are indifferent between letting the pirates produce and selling to the South
at the marginal cost. For simplicity, we will assume all along that the intermediates are produced in
the North. Because no rent can be extracted from the firms using intermediates in the South, no profit
is made on the sales of intermediates to the South. Then, our results are robust to the alternative
assumption that pirates supply competitively the intermediates used in the South.
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where r is the interest rate. The existence of several assets (namely bonds and patents) im-
plies that their rates of return must be equal in equilibrium. Indeed, by log-differentiating
(3.11), we get
∀t ∈ [0,+∞), r(t) =
˙V (t)
V (t)
+
piIG(t)
V (t)
. (3.12)
The profit function of the research sector is piR = A˙V − wA(1 − σ)LRA, where σ is
the subsidy rate to the employment of researchers. Free-entry in this sector leads to the
standard zero-profit condition:
V (t) =
wN(1− σ)
ψA
. (3.13)
The Extraction Sector. The extraction sector maximizes its discounted profits,∫ +∞
t
pR(s)R(s)e−
∫ s
t r(u) du ds, with respect to R(t), t ∈ [0,+∞), under its stock constraint
(2.5).
The latter program thus results in the Hotelling condition
r(t) =
p˙R(t)
pR(t)
, t ∈ [0,+∞). (3.14)
Households' Optimization. The households living in both countries, i = N,S, maxi-
mize their intertemporal utility,
∫ +∞
0
ln
(
Ci
Li
Eλ
)
e−ρt dt, with respect to (Ci)t∈[0,+∞), sub-
ject to their budget constraint and the rule that there are no Ponzi games:
Ci + B˙i ≤ wiLi + rBi +Hi, (3.15)
lim
t→+∞
Bi(t)e
− ∫ t0 r(s) ds = 0, (3.16)
where Hi captures all lump-sum transfers to the country i households
15. This term
includes funding of public subsidies and sharing of tax revenues and profits of local
firms. Appendix B details all the flows of uses and resources of all agents and shows
that HS = p
R(RN + RS) + θSp
RRS and HN = θNp
RRN − pNsNAxN − σwNLAN . More
precisely, HN represents the northern environmental tax revenues minus the subsidies to
the research sector and to the use of intermediates by the northern final sector, while HS
represents the resource revenues and the southern environmental tax revenues. Bi is the
country i's net stock of financial assets16.
The first-order conditions of the above programm imply the standard Ramsey-Keynes
conditions:
gci = r − ρ, i = N,S. (3.17)
3.2 Decentralized Equilibrium Outcome
Let us now characterize the general equilibrium of the economy. For simplicity, we will
present it under some restrictions.
First, in order to focus on the environmental issue, we will correct the distortions
related to the under-investment in research. Moreover, this will simplify the analysis
15The way these two terms enter the representative households' problems supposes that the sharing
of net governments' budgets and positive local rents is symmetric. This assumption implies that the
current paper does not consider local inequality and intra-country transfers.
16These assets are actually bonds demanded by the intermediate sector to finance the buying of patents.
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a good deal17. Above, the optimal subsidy to the use of intermediates in the South is
shown to be zero. As concerns the optimal subsidy in the North, equations (3.1) and
(3.7) and the unity of the marginal cost of producing an intermediate good lead to the
standard subsidy level: soN = 1 − α. Formula (C.12) in Appendix C, together with
(A.24) in Appendix A, show that the optimal subsidy to employment by the research
sector is σo = 1− (1− α)ψ/[β(ρ+ ψLN)/(βρ/(ψ(1− α))− φ(1−α)/βLS)− βρ]. This is a
generalization of the standard subsidy to the case of two countries: one being engaged in
research and the other not enforcing IPRs. In particular, one can note that σo is increasing
in the southern index of productivity, φ: because of the non-enforcement of IPRs in the
South, the northern incentives to innovate do not depend on the diffusion of knowledge;
the subsidy σo aims in particular at making the North internalize the usefulness of its
innovations for the southern final sector. This usefulness is all the larger as the South is
productive.
Second, we restrict the national taxes to evolve over time in the same way and not to
be too decreasing, i.e. gτN (t) = gτS(t) = gτ (t) > −ρ, for all t ∈ [0,+∞). Later, we will
show that it is a necessary condition of the implementation of the first-best equilibrium.
Moreover, a difference in the growth rates of these taxes cannot be assumed for more
than a finite period of time. Indeed, if these taxes diverge forever, the economy would
become too unbalanced in the long run and one country would then collapse18. We will
thus conserve this assumption even when studying the effects of changes in national tax
levels.
Next, let us assume from now on that the southern households do not initially own
bonds, i.e. BS(0) = 0. The amount of bonds being equal to the financial demand of
the intermediate sector to buy patents, it means that the southern households are not
initially the creditors of the owners of patents19.
The main findings about the decentralized equilibrium are summarized in Proposition
2 and detailed below.
Proposition 2 In equilibrium of the decentralized economy, when the subsidies to the
use of the intermediate goods and to employment in research are optimal:
ı) LYN and L
A
N immediately jump to constant values. Thus, gAN = gAS = gA = ψL
A
N is
always constant. The relative output, YN (t)
YS(t)
, is constant over time, is a decreasing function
of the index of southern productivity, φ, and a decreasing function of the relative tax, τN (t)
τS(t)
.
For given local outputs, YN(t) and YS(t), the consumption levels, CN(t) and CS(t), are
respectively increasing and decreasing functions of the northern tax rate, τN(t).
ıı) If gτ is constant over time, the economy immediately jumps to its steady-state, in
17Characterizing completely the equilibrium outcome only requires to set the subsidies to the use of
intermediates at their optimal levels. However, solving the two Romer distortions from the beginning
appears to be much more convenient as regards the presentation of the remainder of the paper. Later
in this section, we will punctually lift the assumption of an optimal subsidy to research employment in
order to examine the effect of environmental taxes on growth.
18In a particular case in which gτN 6= gτS forever, one can show that one of the no-Ponzi game
conditions is violated.
19In the equilibrium at date 0, only the total amount of bonds owned by northern and southern
households is determined. The particular sharing of this amount between both kinds of households is
an arbitrary assumption about initial endowments. This is made for simplicity. Under an alternative
assumption on the sharing of initial financial endowments, our results would have been the same but
conditional on this sharing. It would have thus given more complicated expressions of consumption
levels.
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which: 
gRN = gRS = gR = −ρ− gτ
gCN = gCS = gC = gY = gYN = gYS = gA − γ(ρ+gτ )1−α
gxN = gxS = gx = −γ(ρ+gτ )1−α
.
If gτ = 0, this steady-state equilibrium is identical to the optimal one when households
are indifferent to the environmental quality (λ = 0).
ııı) If gτ (t) is not constant over time, the economy is always in transition. At any date,
the growth rates of RN(t), RS(t), R(t), CN(t), CS(t), C(t), YN(t), YS(t), Y (t), xN(t),
xS(t) and x(t) are decreasing in gτ (t).
Proof of Proposition 2 See Appendix C.
Let us first explain the role of the growth rate of the environmental taxes, gτ , on the
dynamics of the economy. An increase (decrease) in gτ (t) implies a decrease (increase)
in the rate of extraction gR. Indeed, the evolution of the taxes distorts the evolution of
the producer price of the resource. Formally, from the Hotelling rule (3.14), the Ramsey-
Keynes conditions (3.17) and the growth rates given in (C.5) and (C.6), the law of motion
of the resource price is given by gpR = gA + βρ/(1 − α) − γgτ/(1 − α). This affects the
choice of the extraction sector about when to supply the resource. For instance, if this
sector anticipates a higher tax in the future, and thus a relatively lower price, it will
supply more resource immediately and less in the future, i.e. it will extract the resource
faster. In turn, the speed of extraction will influence the growth rates of the other unfixed
inputs, and thus of the total production and consumption. This effect has been cogently
highlighted in some papers (e.g. Sinclair [22], Grimaud and Rougé [10], Sinn [24] and
Daubanes [8]). Beyond the effects of the time profile of the environmental taxes, our
two-country approach enables to study how the level of the tax in one region affects the
global economy.
Let us now examine the effects of the absolute levels of the taxes. These are rather
different from those of their time profile. First, they affect the allocation of the resource
among the two final sectors. Because the producer price of the resource is the same
wherever it is used, an increase in the tax rate of one country relative to the other
renders the resource relatively more expensive there. The marginal productivities being
equalized to the local final prices, this implies that a higher part of the flow of resource
is used, and thus a higher part of the output is produced, in the latter country. In other
words, the levels of the resource taxes imply some relocation of the economic activity.
Second, they imply transfers among countries. In Appendix C, (C.10) and (C.11)
give the initial consumption levels in the two countries: CN(0) = (1 − α)YN(0) −
γρDYN(0)/τN(0) and CS(0) = (1 − α)YS(0) + γρDYN(0)/τN(0), where D is a given
positive scalar. In these equations, the northern tax rate, τN , affects directly, i.e. beyond
its effects through the national outputs, the consumption levels. Precisely, taking as given
the national productions, it affects positively the northern consumption and negatively
the southern one. From condition (3.3), the total payment for the resource input by the
northern final sector is τNp
RRN = γYN . This is composed by the net resource revenues
made in the North, pRRN = γYN/τN , and the tax revenues from the northern use of the
resource, (τN − 1)pRRN = γYN(τN − 1)/τN . From these expressions, the northern output
being taken as constant, an increase in the northern tax rate increases the tax revenues at
the expense of the resource revenues. The former remaining in the North and the latter
being earned by the South, this capture of some resource rents through taxation improves
the consumption of northern households and deteriorates that of the southern ones. This
rent transfer effect has already been mentioned formally out of the environmental litera-
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ture by Bergstrom [4] and Brander and Djajic [6]20. This distributional effect has much
to do with the inelasticity of the asymptotic cumulated extraction of the resource (On
this, see also Sinn [24]). As concerns the tax on the southern use of the resource, τS, it
has not this distributional effect. Indeed, tax revenues made via this tax would be earned
anyway by the South government through resource revenues. Hence, this tax only affects
the relative output of both regions but do not enter directly their consumption.
Let us now evoke the potential dynamic effects of the tax levels. Contrary to their
growth rates, gτ , the levels of the tax, τN and τS, do not affect any growth rate. This is
surprising. Indeed, if the tax levels influence the geographic repartition of the productive
activities, and thus of the use of each intermediate good, and if IPRs are not homo-
geneously enforced across countries, one could expect them to affect the revenues from
innovating, and thus growth. Actually, even if the subsidy to employment in research is
suboptimal, the local taxes have no growth effect. In Appendix C (formula (C.4)), the
allocation of labor is shown to be given by LYN = (ρ+ ψLN)/[ψ(1 + (1− α)/(β(1− σ)))]
and LAN = LN − LYN while growth is driven by gA = ψLAN (formula (C.3)). There is
no labor reallocation in the North after a change in national taxes. Let us consider an
increase in τN . It implies a relocation of the mobile inputs (intermediates and resource)
towards the South. On the one hand, the value of innovations decreases because the
use of intermediates in the South is not profitable. This deteriorates the productivity
of northern researchers. On the other hand, relocation of mobile inputs decreases the
productivity of workers in the northern final sector as well. In a Cobb-Douglas world, the
marginal productivities of labor in the two sectors decrease by the same proportion, thus
not requiring any reallocation on the northern labor market. This explains the absence
of the presumed growth effect of the tax levels21. Nevertheless, this effect would appear
under other functional forms. Generally, because relocation deteriorates the productivity
of northern labor in its two uses, this effect can be expected not to be substantial.
3.3 Optimal Environmental Taxation
In the previous subsection, the subsidies to the use of the intermediates and to the
research sector have been set at their optimal levels. Here, they remain at these levels
so that we keep focusing exclusively on the pollution externality. By comparing the rate
of extraction in the welfare-maximizing allocation and in the decentralized outcome, we
can solve for the resource taxation policy that implement an optimal use over time of the
polluting resource.
The following proposition gives the main characteristics of this policy.
Proposition 3 ı) For the rate of extraction, R, and thus the rate of pollution accumu-
lation, E˙, to be efficient, the local tax rates on the resource use, τN and τS, must evolve
at the same negative rate of growth, goτ .
ıı) For the allocation of the flow of resource, R, between the two final sectors, N and S,
to be efficient, these tax rates must be equalized.
Proof of Proposition 3 See Appendix C.
The equality of both tax rates, τN and τS, is required for efficiency. Indeed, it ensures
that the resource final prices, and thus the resource marginal productivities, are equalized
20Nordhaus and Boyer [15] also mentioned it, but not formally. In their conclusion, they noted that
if the resource supply is perfectly inelastic "(...) carbon taxes may have no economic effect at all and
would simply redistribute rents from the resource owners to the government".
21Here, its absence will simplify substantially the analysis.
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in both countries, which is a necessary condition for static efficiency. However, because
the tax levels do not affect the dynamics of extraction, they play no role in the correction
of the environmental externality.
To correct it, they simply should have the same optimal growth rate. As argued in
the previous subsection, this rate is the relevant instrument to manipulate the extraction
path.
It is worth noting that, even with different local tax levels, the global environmental
problem could be theoretically solved by the use of this latter instrument. The equaliza-
tion of the local taxes has thus nothing to do with the environmental correction but with
the efficiency of the resource allocation.
Overall, the optimal international tax, inducing the efficiency of both the allocation
of the resource over time and the split of its instantaneous flow, is defined up to an
homothecy: if τN(t) = τS(t) = τ(t), t ≥ 0 is optimal, then kτN(t) = kτS(t) = kτ(t), t ≥
0, ∀k > 0 is also optimal.
In Appendix C (formula (C.13)), the optimal time profile of the common tax rate is
shown to be decreasing over time. This time profile would provide the society with an
incentive to postpone the depletion of the polluting resource, i.e. to extract it slower.
This is consistent with the remark in Section 2 that the introduction of pollution implies
a slower optimal depletion. In Sinclair [22] and Groth and Schou [12], the same property
arises. It extends to the case where the flow of pollution is harmful (Grimaud and Rougé
[10]) and is robust to the introduction of a decaying stock of pollution (Ulph and Ulph
[25] and Withagen [26]).
Compared to these results obtained in aggregated models, our two-country approach
emphasizes the need that countries coordinate on an international tax level. The remain-
der of the paper focuses on the difficulty to achieve such a coordination by investigating
the national conflicting viewpoints about the two environmental tax rates.
4 Effects of the National Tax Levels
In this section, we focus on the effects of the environmental taxes on the consumption
levels and welfare of both countries. We keep assuming that the only distortion is en-
vironmental, i.e. sN = s
o
N , sS = s
o
S and σ = σ
o. Moreover, we keep assuming that
gτN = gτS = gτ , but we let this growth rate not be optimal and the environmental tax
rates, τN and τS, not be equals. By effects of the tax levels, we mean effects of the mere
fact that a country sets a higher or a lower tax rate, its time profile, given by gτ (t), t ≥ 0,
remaining unchanged22.
The previous section gave some insights about the effects of the tax levels on con-
sumption. In particular, their distributional aspects provide heterogeneous countries with
conflicting interests. This is why the taxation of polluting exhaustible resources should be
addressed in a multi-country setting featuring some heterogeneity. However, stating this
distributional effect is not sufficient since the tax rates also affect consumption through
their relocational effect, likely to be related to global efficiency. Indeed, one country in the
global economy, when setting its tax rate, faces the interference of these channels. Hence
22More formally, a tax policy is represented by a function of time, τ(t), for all t ∈ [0,+∞). Restricting
attention to functions that are continuous, any tax profile (τ(t))+∞t=0 is completely characterized by ı) an
initial level, τ(0), and ıı) a rate of growth profile, (gτ (t))+∞t=0 . From now on, by considering a change
in the tax level, we refer to a change in the initial level, the growth rate profile remaining unchanged,
that is to say a homothetic transformation of the whole tax profile, i.e. the substitution of τ(t) by kτ(t),
k > 0, for all t ∈ [0,+∞).
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the two kinds of effects on the decentralized equilibrium have to be examined separately
and assessed together. This is the objective of this section.
4.1 Rent Capture
Isolating the rent transfer effect of the tax levels requires to rule out relocation, i.e.
changes in national output. To this purpose, the following proposition considers an
increase in both tax rates that does not modify their ratio.
Proposition 4 An increase in both tax levels, τN and τS, by the same proportion, i.e.
their ratio τN/τS remaining unchanged,
ı) does not entail any relocation, the national outputs, YN and YS, being unaffected at all
dates.
ıı) implies an inter-country transfer, increasing the northern consumption, CN , at the
expense of the southern one, CS, at all dates.
Proof of Proposition 4 See Appendix D.
Since it can be isolated from any distortion, this rent transfer effect is purely distri-
butional.
As detailed in Subsection 3.2, this effect is a transfer from the exploiters' rent to
northern tax revenues. It thus benefits the resource poor economy and deteriorates the
revenues of the resource rich country. Moreover, the tax rates play an asymmetric role:
the only tax rate involved in this rent transfer effect is the northern one. Indeed, the
southern tax rate would make the South collect tax revenues it would have earned anyway
through resource rents.
As a consequence, this effect will provide only the resource poor North with an incen-
tive to tax high.
4.2 Relocation and Global Inefficiency
Changes in the tax ratio entail, in equilibrium, a change in the relative marginal produc-
tivity of the resource. Their effects are twofold. First, it changes the geographic split of
the resource flow, thus modifying national productions. Second, it necessarily affects the
total output. The following proposition assesses these effects.
For simplicity, let us consider a change in the relative tax caused by a unilateral
change in the northern tax level.
Proposition 5 World production, Y = YN +YS, is maximal when the tax levels, τN and
τS, are equalized across countries.
A unilateral increase in the northern tax level, τN ,
ı) leads to some relocation of the final production by decreasing the northern output, YN ,
and increasing the southern one, YS, at all dates.
ıı) yields a global efficiency distortion, the world output increasing at all dates if τN < τS
and decreasing if τN > τS.
Proof of Proposition 5 See Appendix D.
A change in the tax ratio improves the relative competitiveness of one country and
plays an important role on the efficiency of the resource allocation among the two
economies. This allocation is optimal when final prices, and thus marginal resource
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productivities, are equalized. A departure from this equality distorts the world econ-
omy. Proposition 5 tells in particular that the split of the resource flow between the two
countries is all the less efficient as the tax rates are wide apart.
In Figure 2, Y max is the first bisecting line. The derivative of the world production
level at any date with respect to the northern tax level, ∂Y (t)/∂τN(0), ∀t ≥ 0, is zero on
this line, negative above (sectors 1, 2 and 6) and positive below (sectors 3, 4 and 5)23.
E
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Figure 2: Effects of an increase in the northern tax level, τN(0), on 
national consumptions, CN and CS, and world production, Y.
Because relocation comes from changes in the tax ratio, the effect of an increase in the
southern tax level is similar to that in the northern one. Hence, relocation affects both
countries in a rather symmetric way. It implies that a higher tax in one region, whatever
it is, reduces its output. Moreover, the impact of the tax rates on global efficiency gives
a common interest in having close tax rates. However, we shall see later that the more
totally productive one country is, the less affected it is by the relocation resulting from a
relatively higher local tax.
4.3 Effects of a Unilateral Increase in the Tax Level
The national tax levels affect national consumptions and welfare through both rent cap-
ture and relocation. After characterizing these two effects separately, it is worth com-
puting the overall change in national consumptions due to changes in the tax rates. As
in the previous subsection, let us consider a unilateral change in the northern tax level.
The impacts of such a change will depend on how high are the two national levels with
respect to each other.
23Because the tax levels grow at the same rate, we could have represented the graph of Figure 2 in
terms of the tax levels τN (t) and τS(t) at any date t ≥ 0. For consistency with our definition of the tax
levels in note 22 and with Appendix D, we choose a basis in terms of the taxes at date 0.
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The results are formally given in Appendix D. The main findings are presented in
Proposition 6 and illustrated and detailed below.
Proposition 6 An increase in the northern tax level, τN , leads to an increase in the
northern consumption, CN , at all dates if the northern tax level is relatively low. It leads
to an increase in the southern consumption, CS, if both the southern tax level and the
northern one are relatively high.
Proof of Proposition 6 See Appendix D.
In Figure 2, along CNmax and CSmax, the derivatives of the northern and the south-
ern consumption levels at all dates with respect to the northern tax level, ∂CN(t)/∂τN(0)
and ∂CS(t)/∂τN(0), ∀t ≥ 0, respectively, are zero. These loci divide generally24 the
strictly positive orthant into six sectors. ∂CN(t)/∂τN(0) is positive below CNmax (sec-
tors 4, 5 and 6) and negative above (sectors 1, 2 and 3). ∂CS(t)/∂τN(0) is positive above
the defined part of CSmax (sectors 2, 3 and 4) and negative otherwise (sectors 1, 5 and
6).
The interference of the two effects analyzed above happens to be complicated: one
can a priori hardly tell something about the effects of a unilateral tax increase on the
two consumption levels, since they could be everything and anything. Let us refer to our
previous results to understand how the tax rates affect consumption in both regions.
From the northern viewpoint, a greater tax rate would be beneficial if the tax rate is
low and detrimental if it is already high. This results from the trade-off highlighted in
the previous subsections. On the one hand, a greater environmental tax leads to more
tax revenues. On the other hand, it leads to less competitiveness relatively to the other
country, and thus relocation of its productive activities. Proposition 6 tells that the
latter effect more than compensates the former when the North has a relatively high
tax rate and inversely otherwise. This northern tax increase leads to a greater southern
consumption if both the northern and the southern tax rates are high. In that case, the
relocation effect benefits the South but fails to compensate the substantial rent capture
effect.
What about the viewpoint of the South with respect to its own tax rate? A greater
tax rate in the South would make it relatively less competitive. Moreover, as noted in
Subsection 4.1, the South would not benefit from any rent capture effect.
As a result, if countries are not coordinated in the setting of their local taxes, the
North would choose a relative high tax rate.
In order to illustrate this and the conflicting interests of the two different regions
as concerns their environmental tax levels, let us consider that the two governments
use strategically their tax levels to maximize their residents' utilities, subject to the
decentralized decisions of firms. For simplicity, assume that the rate of growth of the taxes
is given to them. In this context, the best-response of the North government (maximizing
northern welfare) can be shown to be represented by CNmax. In Appendix D, the best-
response of the South (maximizing southern welfare) is computed: it is independent of
the northern tax rate. It is thus represented in Figure 2 by a vertical line that is shown to
be located at the right of the vertical asymptote of CSmax. Hence, the Nash equilibrium
of this simple game is along CNmax, at a point below the vertical asymptote of CSmax
(as for instance, point E in Figure 2). Let us give further details and make two remarks
on this equilibrium.
24The form of Figure 2 and its sectors are general. Figure 2 is an illustration for a certain combination
of parameters but its form is shown to be general in Appendix D.
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First, in the Nash outcome, the North has indeed a greater tax rate than the South.
Our examination of the rent transfer effect and of the relocation effect suggests that
this gap is mainly due to the asymmetric rent transfer effect, the North benefiting more
than the South from a high tax rate on the polluting resource. This implies that the
economically relevant regions of Figure 2 are sectors 1 and 6. These regions are also
relevant because this Nash equilibrium is consistent with empirical findings. Indeed,
Bacon [2] shows that tax rates on petroleum products are significantly higher in oil
importing countries than in oil exporting counties. In particular, taxes on petroleum
products in developed oil consuming countries are very high (IEA [14]).
Second, the equation of CNmax, in (D.1), shows that the best-response of the North
is decreasing in the index of development of the South, φ, whereas the best-response of
the South is independent of φ. Hence, the poorer the South is, the higher point E is along
the southern best-response, and the wider the gap between the northern and the southern
tax rates. The explanation for this is the following: from the northern viewpoint, the
negative effect of a high tax rate is its loss of competitiveness and the related relocation
towards the South. The less totally productive the South is, the less affected by the
threat of relocation the North is. As a result, the North chooses a tax rate that is all the
greater as the South is low-productive. This is also supported by Bacon's observations.
Indeed, he notes that higher-income countries set their average per unit taxes on gasoline
and diesel two and a half times higher than developing countries do.
Eventually, these remarks imply that the current distortion due to the gap between
the tax rates in the oil consuming countries and those in the oil producing ones is all
the more serious as the latter have a relatively low productivity compared to the former.
Moreover, it suggests that an increase in the tax rates on petroleum products in some
oil consuming countries, where these rates are already very high (sector 1 in Figure 2),
would deteriorate the efficiency of the world allocation of oil and would make people of
the two regions worse-off.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we have divided a model of a non-renewable resource depletion and of
pollution accumulation into two regions in order to investigate the inter-country effects
of local environmental taxes in a heterogeneous world. We have then constructed a two-
country growth model in which the South is endowed with the entire stock of an essential
polluting non-renewable resource and in which world economic growth is driven by a
northern research sector.
First, the welfare maximizing allocation and the decentralized equilibrium outcome for
given national tax rates have been fully characterized. Consistently with the one-country
literature, we obtain that the time-profile of environmental taxes alters the extraction
path and thus the speed of pollution accumulation. The socially optimal resource deple-
tion is implemented through decreasing ad valorem tax rates on the use of the polluting
resource in the two countries. Beyond the correction of the environmental problem, this
extension to two countries emphasizes that their coordination on a common tax level
is required to ensure the efficiency of the resource allocation. However, this coordina-
tion appears to be difficult given the divergent views of the two heterogeneous countries
regarding their tax rates.
Our study of the international effects of national environmental tax rates highlights
the reasons of this coordination problem. First, higher taxes lead to a partial capture of
the southern resource rent by the North through tax revenues in a purely distributional
way. Second, a higher environmental tax in one country deteriorates its relative compet-
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itiveness. The resulting relocation deteriorates global efficiency of the international split
of the resource flow if it moves one tax rate further apart the other. However, in spite of
this relocation and the heterogeneous IPRs protection, local tax levels do not affect the
effort of research and thus growth.
As a result of these effects, the oil poor region is attracted by high environmental tax
rates while the oil rich region is not. If the tax levels are set at the national scale, they
will be used strategically, thus entailing heterogeneous tax rates. The resulting gap in
environmental taxes appears to be all the wider as the oil-rich countries are relatively
poor. Overall, a global distortion arises on the allocation of oil, which is of a particular
concern as this resource is bound to get scarcer and scarcer.
Furthermore, we have assessed the effect of a hypothetical increase in the northern
tax rate on the polluting exhaustible resource. From the current situation, with already
very high environmental taxes in the North, the analysis suggests that increasing their
level would deteriorate global efficiency and would make the two regions worse-off.
Addressing the strategic tax-setting issue in a satisfying way would actually require to
apply dynamic game theoretic tools, which is extremely difficult in a resource depletion
model. Further research must tackle this question in order to improve our understanding
of environmental tax design. Indeed, whether taxes are used or not to implement inter-
national environmental policies, homogenizing the currently very heterogeneous taxes on
oil will be needed to improve the allocation of this scarce resource.
A Appendix: Model and Welfare
Typically, the amount of each intermediate good does not depend on its identity. Due
to the Inada conditions verified by the utility functions, the technical constraints will
be binding and the non-negativity constraints can be dropped. Then the optimization
problem of the social planner reduces to the maximization of (2.11) with respect to
Ci, xi, Ri, L
Y
N , i = N,S subject to
CN + CS + AxN + φAxS = AxN
αLYN
β
RN
γ + φAxS
αLS
βRS
γ, (A.1)
A˙ = ψA(LN − LYN), (A.2)
Q˙ = −(RN +RS), (A.3)
E˙ = −h(RN +RS). (A.4)
Let µY , µA, µQ and µE denote the present-value multipliers associated respectively to
the constraints (A.1)-(A.4). The first-order and transversality conditions that should be
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satisfied are
δ
LN
CN
e−ρt = µY , (A.5)
(1− δ)LS
CS
e−ρt = µY , (A.6)
α
YN
xN
= A, (A.7)
α
YS
xS
= φA, (A.8)
µY γ
YN
RN
= µQ + hµE, (A.9)
µY γ
YS
RS
= µQ + hµE, (A.10)
µY β
YN
LYN
= µAψA, (A.11)
µY
µA
(YN + YS
A
− xN − φxS
)
+ ψ(LN − LYN) = −
µ˙A
µA
, (A.12)
µ˙Q = 0, (A.13)
δLNλe
−ρt + (1− δ)LSλe−ρt = −Eµ˙E, (A.14)
lim
t→+∞
µA(t)A(t) = 0, (A.15)
lim
t→+∞
µQ(t)Q(t) = 0, (A.16)
lim
t→+∞
µE(t)E(t) = 0. (A.17)
a) From (A.7) and (A.8) we have YS
YN
= φxS
xN
, while from (A.9) and (A.10) we get YS
YN
=
RS
RN
. Combining those two equations with the reduced forms YN = AxN
αLYN
β
RN
γ and
YS = φAxS
αLS
βRS
γ, we get
Y oS (t)
Y oN(t)
=
RoS(t)
RoN(t)
=
φxoS(t)
xoN(t)
= φ
1−α
β
LS
LYN
o . (A.18)
b) Rewrite (A.1) as
CN + CS + AxN + φAxS = YN + YS. (A.19)
Substituting in (A.19) the conditions (A.7) and (A.8) and rearranging we get
Co(t)
Y o(t)
= 1− α and A
o
N(t)x
o
N(t) + φA
o
N(t)x
o
S(t)
Y o(t)
= α. (A.20)
c) From (A.2), we have immediately
gAoN = gAoS = gAo = ψL
A
N
o
. (A.21)
d) Now, we show that LYN is constant. Log-differentiating (A.11), we get µ˙Y /µY−µ˙A/µA =
gA + gLYN − gYN . Log-differentiating (A.5), we get µ˙Y /µY = −gCN − ρ. Plugging this into
the previous equation, we obtain −µ˙A/µA = gCN + ρ+ gA + gLYN − gYN . From (A.11), we
also have µY /µA = ψAL
Y
N/βYN . Substituting the expressions of −µ˙A/µA and µY /µA in
(A.12) and simplifying by (A.20), we obtain
gCN − gYN + gLYN = −ρ+
ψ
β
(1− α)LYN
(YN + YS)
YN
, (A.22)
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where (YN + YS)/YN = (L
Y
N + φ
(1−α)/βLS)/LYN , from (A.18).
From (A.5), (A.6) and (A.20), we have gCN = gCS = gC = gY . Thus, we have
gCN−gYN = gY −gYN = ( ˙YN+Y˙S)/(YN+YS)− ˙YN/YN = (Y˙SYN− ˙YNYS)/((YN+YS)YN) =
˙(YS/YN)/(1 + YS/YN). Using (A.18), YS/YN = φ
(1−α)/βLS/LYN , which gives ˙(YS/YN) =
−φ(1−α)/βLSgLYN/LYN , the previous equation reduces to gCN−gYN = −φ(1−α)/βLSgLYN/(LYN+
φ(1−α)/βLS). Substituting this later expression in (A.22) and defining u = LYN+φ
(1−α)/βLS,
we obtain the differential equation u˙ = −ρu+ (1− α)ψu2/β, whose solution is25
u =
1
eρt
(
1
u(0)
− (1− α) ψ
βρ
)
+ (1− α) ψ
βρ
. (A.23)
From (A.11), the transversality condition (A.15), writes
limt→+∞ µY YN/LYN = 0. Note that (1−δ)CN(0)µY /LN+δCS(0)µY /LS is a constant frac-
tion of µY so that the transversality condition rewrites limt→+∞[(1 − δ)CN(0)µY /LN +
δCS(0)µY /LS]YN/L
Y
N = 0. Using now (A.5) and (A.6), the term in brackets is δ(1 −
δ)e−ρt[CN(0)/CN + CS(0)/CS]. Since gCN = gCS = gC = gY , this term rewrites 2δ(1 −
δ)e−ρte−
∫ t
0 gY (s)ds, i.e. 2δ(1− δ)e−ρtY (0)/Y . Finally, the transversality condition becomes
limt→+∞ YNe−ρt/(Y LYN) = 0. Using that Y = YN + YS and equation (A.18), this eventu-
ally yields limt→+∞ e−ρt/u(t) = 0.
From (A.23), limt→+∞ e−ρt/u(t) = 1/u(0)− (1− α)ψ/(βρ). Then, from the transver-
sality condition, u(0) = βρ/((1 − α)ψ), which is the steady-state value of u. Hence, LYN
jumps also at date 0 to its constant value given by
LYN
o
=
βρ
ψ(1− α) − φ
1−α
β LS, L
A
N
o
= LN − LYNo, LYS o = LS. (A.24)
e) Substituting (A.5) in (A.9), we get µQ+hµE = γδLNe
−ρtYN/(CNRN). Combining this
result with (A.14), we find µ˙E/(µQ + hµE) = −λ(δLN + (1− δ)LS)CNRN/(γδLNYNE).
Using now that from (A.5) and (A.6), (1 − δ)LSCN/(δLN) = CS, we finally have:
µ˙E/(µQ+ hµE) = −λ(CN +CS)RN/(γYNE). From (A.9) and (A.10), we have YN/RN =
YS/RS, and thus YN/RN = Y/R. Moreover, from (A.20), C = (1 − α)Y . Finally, the
previous equation rewrites µ˙E/(µQ + hµE) = −λ(1− α)R/(γE).
Log-differentiating equation (A.9) after substituting µY from (A.5), we get another
expression of µ˙E/(µQ + hµE): µ˙E/(µQ + hµE) = (gYN − gCN − gRN − ρ). Using (A.18)
and the constancy of LYN , we have gYN = gYS = gY and gRN = gRS = gR. Moreover, from
(A.20), we have gY = gC , while we already know that gCN = gCS = gC . Then, equalizing
the left-hand sides of both equations above, we get gR = (hλ(1 − α)/γ)R/E − ρ. Using
now (A.4), we obtain gR = −λ(1− α)gE/γ − ρ. We then have
gRoN (t) = gRoS(t) = gRo(t) = −ρ−
λ(1− α)
γ
gEo(t). (A.25)
f) Log-differentiating the production functions (2.1) in which xi(j) = xi, i = N,S, one
gets gYi = gA + αgxi + γgRi since gLYi = 0. Log-differentiating (A.7) and (A.8), we have
gxi = gYi − gA, i = N,S. It follows
gCoN (t) = gCoS(t) = gCo(t) = gY o(t) = gY oN (t) = gY oS (t) = gAo +
γ
1− αgRo(t), (A.26)
gxoN (t) = gxoS(t) = gxo(t) =
γ
1− αgRo(t). (A.27)
25In order to transform this Ricatti differential equation into a linear first-order one, we consider a
new variable z ≡ 1/u, which implies z˙ = −u˙/u2.
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g) From (A.5) and (A.6), we get
CoN(t)/LN
CoS(t)/LS
=
δ
1− δ , 0 < δ < 1. (A.28)
The previous equations give Proposition 1 and the other results of Section 2.
B Appendix: The Agents Uses and Resources
NORTH
Uses Households Resources
consumption: CN wN (LYN + LAN ): wages
accumulation of assets: B˙N rBN : interests
HN = −T
= θNpRRN − pNsNAxN − σwNLAN
Uses Firms Resources
wages: wNLYN YN : sales
resource: pRRN pNsNAxN : subsidy to
taxes on resource use:
θNp
RRN
the use of intermediates
intermediates: AxN/α
Research and
Uses intermediate sectors Resources
wages: wNLAN AxN/α: sales of intermedi-
ates
buying of final good: AxN B˙: debt variation
interests: rB σwNLAN : subsidy to the em-
ployment of researchers
Uses Government Resources
subsidy to the use of inter-
mediates: pNsNAxN
θNpRRN: environmental
taxes
subsidy to the employment
of researchers: σwNLAN
T: taxes on households
From the uses and resources of the households and the government, HN is the environ-
mental tax revenues of the North minus the public expenses which are the subsidies to
the research sector and to the use of the intermediates. It can be negative or positive
and represents the contribution of the northern households to the public expenses.
SOUTH
Uses Households Resources
consumption: CS wSLS : wages
accumulation of assets: B˙S rBS : interests
HS = pR(RN +RS) + θSpRRS
Uses Firms Resources
wages: wSLS YS : sales
resource: pRRS
tax on resource use: θSpRRS
intermediates: φAxS
Uses Resource sector Resources
profits: pR(RN +RS) pR(RN +RS): sales
Uses Intermediate sector Resources
buying of final good: φAxS φAxS : sales
Uses Government Resources
redistribution: θSpRRS θSpRRS : tax revenue
Here, we see that HS is composed by the profits of the resource sector and the tax revenue
from the environmental tax on the resource use. HS is non ambiguously positive.
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C Appendix: Decentralized Equilibrium for Given Na-
tional Taxes
From (2.4), the marginal cost of producing intermediates is equal to unity. The left-hand
side of (3.1) is the marginal productivity of intermediate goods used in the North. Thus,
using (3.5), one gets that the subsidy to their use, ensuring that marginal cost equals
marginal productivity, is soN = 1−α. On the contrary, from (3.6), the intermediates used
in the South are sold at their marginal cost. Hence, no subsidy is needed in the South,
i.e. soS = 0. Let us assume that sN = s
o
N and sS = s
o
S all along.
Moreover, we assume that gτN (t) = gτS(t) = gτ (t) > −ρ, ∀t ≥ 0. This implies that
τN(t)/τS(t) is constant over time.
Here, we only restrict σ to be constant and make no assumption on BS(0). We will
fix the values of these parameters later in the proof.
a) Write the ratio of both production functions from (2.1) after noting that, from (3.9),
xi(j) = xi, i = N,S. Compute the ratio of the resource quantities used by each final
sector from equations (3.3) and (3.6). Using (3.1) and (3.4) after replacing the equilibrium
prices given by (3.7) and (3.8), write the ratio of xS/xN . Combining these three ratios,
we find
YS(t)
YN(t)
=
τS(t)RS(t)
τN(t)RN(t)
=
φxS(t)
xN(t)
=
(τN(t)
τS(t)
) γ
β
φ
1−α
β
(LS
LYN
)
. (C.1)
b) (3.9) can be written αYN/xN = A and αYS/xS = φA. Substituting these conditions
in (2.9) leads to C = (1− α)Y , which gives
C(t)
Y (t)
= 1− α, A(t)xN(t) + φA(t)xS(t)
Y (t)
= α. (C.2)
c) From (2.2), we immediately have
gAN = gAS = gA = ψL
A
N . (C.3)
d) We now show that LYN is constant over time. Combining (3.10) and (3.13) we get
piIG/V = (1 − α)ψAxN/(α(1 − σ)wN). Substituting wN from (3.2) and using AxN =
αYN from above, we find piIG/V = (1 − α)ψLYN/(β(1 − σ)). From (3.13), we also
obtain that gV = gwN − gA which gives from (3.2) gV = gYN − gLYN − gA. Substi-
tuting the later expressions of gV and piIG/V in (3.12) and replacing the rate of in-
terest with r = gC + ρ (from (3.17)) and rearranging, we get a first expression of
gC − gYN : gC − gYN = −ρ − gLYN − gA + (1 − α)ψLYN/(β(1 − σ)). Due to equation
(C.2), gC − gYN = gY − gYN = ( ˙YN + Y˙S)/(YN + YS)− ˙YN/YN . Using (C.1), the previous
equation reduces to gC−gYN = −gLYN/[1+φ(α−1)/β(τS/τN)γ/βLYN/LS] (in the same way as
in d) of Appendix A). Replacing this second expression of gC−gYN and gA = ψ(LN−LYN)
together in the first expression of gC − gYN above and rearranging, we get: L˙YN = −(ρ+
ψLN)[L
Y
N+φ
(1−α)/β(τN/τS)γ/βLS]+[ψ+(1−α)ψ/β(1−σ)][LYN+φ(1−α)/β(τN/τS)γ/β LS]LYN .
Defining y = (LYN + φ
(1−α)/β(τN/τS)γ/βLS
)−1
, we eventually get the following differential
equation: y˙ =
[
ρ+ ψLN +
(
ψ + (1− α)ψ/β(1− σ))φ(1−α)/β(τN/τS)γ/βLS]y − (ψ + (1−
α)ψ/β(1−σ)). The solution of this equation is y(t) = e
[
ρ+ψLN+
(
ψ+
(1−α)ψ
β(1−σ)
)
φ
1−α
β (τN/τS)
γ
β LS
]
t[
y(0)− ψ+
(1−α)ψ
β(1−σ)
ρ+ψLN+
(
ψ+
(1−α)ψ
β(1−σ)
)
φ
1−α
β (τN/τS)
γ
β LS
]
+
ψ+
(1−α)ψ
β(1−σ)
ρ+ψLN+
(
ψ+
(1−α)ψ
β(1−σ)
)
φ
1−α
β (τN/τS)
γ
β LS
. We show now
that y jumps immediately to its steady-state value. By (3.17), the transversality con-
ditions (3.16) imply limt→+∞Bi(t)e−ρte−
∫ t
0 gC(s) ds = 0, i = N,S, what in turn implies
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limt→+∞(BN(t)+BS(t))e−ρte−
∫ t
0 gC(s) ds = 0. Note now that BN+BS = AV from the equi-
librium of the financial market. Using this and the free-entry condition (3.13), we find that
the transversality conditions imply limt→+∞ e−ρte−
∫ t
0 gC(s) dsYN/L
Y
N = 0, and, since gC =
gY from (C.2), this implies limt→+∞ e−ρtYN/((YN + YS)LYN) = 0, what can be expressed
after developing as limt→+∞ e−ρt/y(t) = 0, which is possible, from above, only if y(t) =
y(0) = [ψ+(1−α)ψ/β(1−σ)]/[ρ+ψLN +(ψ+(1−α)ψ/β(1−σ))φ(1−α)/β(τN/τS)γ/βLS],
∀t ≥ 0. Eventually, this is equivalent to say that LYN jumps also at date 0 to its constant
value:
LYN =
ρ+ ψLN
ψ(1 + 1−α
β(1−σ))
, LAN = LN − LYN , LYS = LS. (C.4)
e) Next, we show how to obtain the rate of extraction. Let us log-differentiate conditions
(3.3) and (3.6). Using (3.17) and (3.14), we obtain gYi − gRi = gCi + ρ + gτ , i = N,S.
Combining those later equations and using that gCN = gCS = gC = gY from (3.17) and
(C.2), we get gYN + gYS − 2gY − gRN − gRS = 2ρ + 2gτ , i = N,S. Since LYN is constant,
(C.1) implies that gYN = gYS = gY and gRN = gRS = gR. From the previous equation,
one also gets gR = −ρ− gτ , that is
gRN (t) = gRS(t) = gR(t) = −ρ− gτ (t). (C.5)
f) From (3.17), gCN (t) = gCS(t) = gC(t). (C.2) implies gC(t) = gY (t). (C.1) and the
constancy of LYN implies gYN (t) = gYS(t) = gY (t). Let us show what the values of these
growth rates and that of the quantity of intermediates are. The log-differentiation of the
functional form of both production functions (2.1) in which xi(j) = xi, i = N,S and
LYN is constant gives gYi = gA + αgxi + γgRi , i = N,S. The log-differentiation of (3.9),
gxi = γgRi/(1− α), i = N,S, and gRN = gRS = gR thus lead to
gCN (t) = gCS(t) = gC(t) = gY (t) = gYN (t) = gYS(t) = gA +
γ
1− αgR(t)(C.6)
and gxN (t) = gxS(t) = gx(t) =
γ
1− αgR(t). (C.7)
g) Let us now obtain the expressions of local final production levels. From equation (C.5),
R(0) is determined by
∫ +∞
0
R(0)e−
∫ t
0 (ρ+gτ (s)) ds dt= Q0. Then, R(0) is increasing inQ0 and
independent from τN/τS. By (C.1), we getRN(0) = R(0)[1+φ
(1−α)/β(τN/τS)γ/β+1LS/LYN ]
−1
and RS(0) = R(0)[1 + φ
(α−1)/β(τS/τN)γ/β+1LYN/LS]
−1. Using the demands for inter-
mediate goods (3.9) (recall that 1 − sN = α), we can immediately compute xN(0) =
α1/(1−α)LYN
β/(1−α)
RN(0)
γ/(1−α) and xS(0) = α1/(1−α)L
β/(1−α)
S RS(0)
γ/(1−α). Putting these
quantities in the production functions expressed at date 0, we finally get
YN(0) = A0α
α
1−αLYN
β
1−α
( R(0)
1 + φ
1−α
β ( τN (0)
τS(0)
)
γ
β
+1 LS
LYN
) γ
1−α
(C.8)
and YS(0) = φA0α
α
1−αLS
β
1−α
( R(0)
1 + φ
α−1
β ( τS(0)
τN (0)
)
γ
β
+1LYN
LS
) γ
1−α
. (C.9)
h) Let us now obtain the expressions of the consumption levels. Substituting (3.5), (3.6)
and (3.3) in the budget constraint of country S representative household (3.15) and using
θi = τi − 1, i = N,S, we find B˙S + CS = (1− α)YS + γYN/τN + rBS.
As the northern research sector is a net borrower and constitutes the only group of
agents the households can trade with on the financial market, the equalization of its uses
and resources from Appendix B writes wNL
A
N +AxN + rB = σwNL
A
N +
1
α
AxN + B˙, where
B = BN +BS. Using this condition to substitute the B˙N − rBN in the budget constraint
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of country N representative agent and simplifying with equations (3.2), (3.3), (3.7) and
(3.9), we get: −B˙S + CN = (1− α)YN − γYN/τN − rBS.
Solving those two instantaneous budget constraints as first-order linear differential
equations in BS, we obtain two intertemporal budget constraints that hold for any date
T ≥ 0: −BS(T )e−
∫ T
0 r(t) dt +
∫ T
0
CN(t)e
− ∫ t0 r(s) ds dt
= (1− α) ∫ T
0
YN(t)e
− ∫ t0 r(s) ds dt− γ ∫ T
0
YN (t)
τN (t)
e−
∫ t
0 r(s) ds dt−BS(0)
and BS(T )e
− ∫ T0 r(t) dt + ∫ T
0
CS(t)e
− ∫ t0 r(s) ds dt
= (1 − α) ∫ T
0
YS(t)e
− ∫ t0 r(s) ds dt + γ ∫ T
0
YN (t)
τN (t)
e−
∫ t
0 r(s) ds dt + BS(0). Taking the limit as
T → +∞ of those two equations, the terms on the far left vanish (from the no-Ponzi-
game conditions (3.16)) and the intertemporal budget constraints become
−BS(0) =
∫ +∞
0
[CN(t) + (1− α)YN(t) + γYN(t)/τN(t)]e−
∫ t
0 r(s) ds dt and
−BS(0) =
∫ +∞
0
[(1 − α)YS(t) − CS(t) + γYN(t)/τN(t)]e−
∫ t
0 r(s) ds dt. Finally, using from
equations (3.17) and (C.6) that gCN = gCS = gYN = gYS = r − ρ and reminding that
gτ (t) > −ρ, t ∈ [0,+∞), these equations reduce to
CN(0) = (1− α)YN(0)− γρDYN(0)
τN(0)
− ρBS(0) (C.10)
and CS(0) = (1− α)YS(0) + γρDYN(0)
τN(0)
+ ρBS(0), (C.11)
where D =
∫ +∞
0
e−
∫ t
0 (ρ+gτ (s)) ds dt > 0.
i) The optimal subsidy to the labor employment by the research sector can be simply
found out by equalizing the optimal quantity of labor used by this sector, LAN
o
, given by
equation (A.24), and the same quantity in equilibrium which is given by equation (C.4).
We obtain
σo = 1− (1− α)ψ
β(ρ+ψLN )
LYN
o − βψ
. (C.12)
The previous formulae give Proposition 2 and the results of Subsection 3.2 when the
restrictions BS(0) = 0 and σ = σ
o are imposed.
j) Eventually, let us characterize the optimal environmental taxation policy. The fact that
the environmental tax levels must equalize to ensure the efficiency of the world economy
can be seen by comparing equations (C.1) and (A.18). Note that this results actually
from the equality of the marginal resource productivities (see equations (3.3) and (3.6)).
This implies that their time profiles must be identical. Their optimal common growth
rate is obtained by equalizing the optimal rate of extraction, given by (A.25), and the
equilibrium rate of extraction, given by (C.5):
goτ (t) =
λ(1− α)
γ
gEo(t). (C.13)
This rate is negative since gE is technically bound to be negative. Moreover, as g
o
R, has
been shown to be strictly negative, then, from equation (C.5), we get that goτ > −ρ.
This last point gives Proposition 3.
D Appendix: Effects of the National Tax Levels
a) From equations (C.8) and (C.9), it is straightforward that a proportional increase in
both initial tax levels, τN(0) and τS(0), i.e. a change in these initial tax levels their ratio
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remaining constant, does not affect both national productions, YN(0) and YS(0). Since
such an increase does not affect the growth rate of these productions, such a change
affects neither the national productions nor the world production at all dates t ≥ 0.
b) Using equations (C.10) and (C.11), let us now examine the effects of a proportional
increase in both tax levels on the initial national consumption levels, CN(0) and CS(0).
Since such a change does not affect the outputs, its effects on consumptions can only
be through the direct presence of τN(0) in expressions (C.10) and (C.11). It turns out
immediately that CN(0) increases and CS(0) decreases consequently to such an increase.
In the same way as for productions, the considered change having no dynamic effect, both
national consumptions react at all dates t ≥ 0 just as initial national consumptions do.
The results of a) and b) above give Proposition 4.
In the following, let us use the variable χ = φ(1−α)/β(τN(0)/τS(0))γ/β+1LS/LYN .
c) Let us now show how an increase in the northern tax level affects the national pro-
ductions. From expression (C.8), we get YN(0) = A0α
α/(1−α)LYN
β/(1−α)
R(0)γ/(1−α)(1 +
χ)−γ/(1−α). Hence, ∂YN(0)/∂τN(0) = A0αα/(1−α)LYN
β/(1−α)
R(0)γ/(1−α)(−γ/(1 − α))(1 +
χ)−γ/(1−α)−1(γ/β + 1)χ/τN(0). Using α + β + γ and rearranging, this reduces to
∂YN(0)/∂τN(0) = −(γ/β)(YN(0)/τN(0))(χ/(1 + χ)) < 0. In the same way, from (C.9),
YS(0) = φA0α
α/(1−α)LSβ/(1−α)R(0)γ/(1−α)(1 + χ−1)−γ/(1−α) and we find ∂YS(0)/∂τN(0) =
(γ/β)(YS(0)/τN(0))(χ
−1/(1 + χ−1)) > 0.
d) Here, we derive the effect of the northern tax rate on the world output.
ı) From the previous results, ∂Y (0)/∂τN(0) = ∂YN(0)/∂τN(0) + ∂YS(0)/∂τN(0)
= (γ/β)((YS(0)/τN(0))(χ
−1/(1 + χ−1))− (YN(0)/τN(0))(χ/(1 + χ))).
Then, ∂Y (0)/∂τN(0) > (resp <)0 ⇐⇒ YS(0)(χ−1/(1 + χ−1)) > (resp <)YN(0)(χ/(1 +
χ)) ⇐⇒ YS(0)/YN(0) > (resp <)χ. Finally, using equation (C.1), developing χ and
simplifying, we find ∂Y (0)/∂τN(0) > (resp <)0⇐⇒ τN(0) < (resp >)τS(0).
ıı) Y (0) is strictly increasing in τN(0) on (0, τS(0)) and strictly decreasing on (τS(0),+∞)
and is continuous in τN(0). Hence, Y (0) is maximum in τN(0) at τN(0) = τS(0).
Once again, since the initial levels, τN(0) and τS(0), have no dynamic effect, the previ-
ous results are valid for all dates t ≥ 0: ∂YN(t)/∂τN(0) < 0, ∂YS(t)/∂τN(0) > 0 and
∂Y (t)/∂τN(0) > (resp <)0⇐⇒ τN(0) < (resp >)τS(0), ∀t ∈ [0,+∞).
The results of c) and d) above give Proposition 5.
e) Now, we solve for the effect of a change in the northern tax level on the north-
ern consumption. From (C.10), we get ∂CN(0)/∂τN(0) = (1 − α)∂YN(0)/∂τN(0) −
γρD(∂YN(0)/∂τN(0))/τN(0) + γρDYN(0)/τN(0)
2. Using the definition of variable χ and
the results of c) above, we have ∂CN(0)/∂τN(0) = −((1−α)γ/β)(YN(0)/τN(0))χ/(1+χ)+
(γ/β)γρD(YN(0)/τN(0)
2)χ/(1+χ)+γρDYN(0)/τN(0)
2 = [(χ/(1+χ))YN(0)/τN(0)
2][−(1−
α)γτN(0)/β + γ
2ρD/β + γρD(1 + χ)/χ], where the sum of the last two terms between
brackets yields γρD/χ+(1−α)γρD/β. Hence, ∂CN(0)/∂τN(0) > (resp <)0⇐⇒ ρD/χ >
(resp <)((1− α)/β)(τN(0)− ρD). From this proposition, we can see that:
ı) If τN(0) ≤ ρD, then @τS(0) > 0 : ∂CN(0)/∂τN(0) < 0, since χ > 0. Hence, if
τN(0) ≤ ρD, then ∂CN(0)/∂τN(0) > 0, ∀τS(0) > 0.
ıı) If τN(0) > ρD, ∂CN(0)/∂τN(0) > (resp <)0⇐⇒ ρD(φ(1−α)/βLS/LYN)−1τS(0)(1−α)/β >
(resp <)((1 − α)/β)(τN(0)(1−α)/β+1 − ρDτN(0)(1−α)/β) ⇐⇒ τS(0) > (resp <)τ̂S(τN(0)),
where
τ̂S
(
τN(0)
)
=
((1− α)
βρD
φ
1−α
β
LS
LYN
) β
1−α
(
τN(0)
1−α
β
+1 − ρDτN(0)
1−α
β
) β
1−α
. (D.1)
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By continuity, the curve defined by equation τS(0) = τ̂S(τN(0)) is the set of pairs
(τN(0), τS(0)) along which ∂CN(0)/∂τN(0) = 0. Since the initial tax levels have no dy-
namic effect, ∂CN(t)/∂τN(0) = 0 at all dates t ≥ 0 along this curve and ∂CN(t)/∂τN(0)
is of the same sign as ∂CN(0)/∂τN(0).
f) Now, we solve for the effect of a change in the northern tax level on the south-
ern consumption. From (C.11), we get ∂CS(0)/∂τN(0) = (1 − α)∂YS(0)/∂τN(0) +
γρD(∂YN(0)/∂τN(0))/τN(0)− γρDYN(0)/τN(0)2. Using the definition of variable χ and
the results of c) above, we have ∂CS(0)/∂τN(0) = ((1 − α)γ/β)(YS(0)/τN(0))χ−1/(1 +
χ−1)−
(γ/β)γρD(YN(0)/τN(0)
2)χ/(1+χ)−γρDYN(0)/τN(0)2 = [(χ/(1+χ))YN(0)/τN(0)2][((1−
α)γ/β)(τN(0)YS(0)/YN(0))(χ
−1/(1+χ−1))((1+χ)/χ)−γ2ρD/β−γρD(1+χ)/χ], where
YS(0)/YN(0) = χτS(0)/τN(0) by (C.1) and the sum of the last two terms between brackets
is−γρD/χ−(1−α)γρD/β. Hence, ∂CS(0)/∂τN(0) > (resp <)0⇐⇒ ((1−α)γ/β)(τS(0)−
ρD) > (resp <)γρD/χ. From this proposition, we can see that:
ı) If τS(0) ≤ ρD, then @τN(0) > 0 : ∂CS(0)/∂τN(0) > 0. Hence, if τS(0) ≤ ρD, then
∂CS(0)/∂τN(0) < 0, ∀τN(0) > 0.
ıı) If τS(0) > ρD, ∂CS(0)/∂τN(0) > (resp <)0
⇐⇒ [(1−α)φ(1−α)/βLS/βρDLYN ][τS(0)−(1−α)/β+1−ρDτS(0)−(1−α)/β] > (resp <)τN(0)−(1−α)/β
⇐⇒ τN(0) > (resp <)τ̂N(τS(0)), where
τ̂N
(
τS(0)
)
=
(1− α
βρD
φ
1−α
β
LS
LYN
)− β
1−α
(
τS(0)
− 1−α
β
+1 − ρDτS(0)−
1−α
β
)− β
1−α
. (D.2)
By continuity, the curve defined by equation τN(0) = τ̂N(τS(0)) is the set of pairs
(τN(0), τS(0)) along which ∂CS(0)/∂τN(0) = 0. Since the initial tax levels have no dy-
namic effect, ∂CS(t)/∂τN(0) = 0 at all dates t ≥ 0 along this curve and ∂CS(t)/∂τN(0)
is of the same sign as ∂CS(0)/∂τN(0).
g) We explain now that both curves defined by τS(0) = τ̂S(τN(0)) and τN(0) = τ̂N(τS(0)),
called respectively CNmax and CSmax, cross only once and that their point of intersection
is on the first bisecting line, i.e. such that τN(0) = τS(0).
Both equations τS(0) = τ̂S(τN(0)) and τN(0) = τ̂N(τS(0)) form a system of equations
with two unknowns. We look for its solution(s) in (τN(0), τS(0)) ∈ [ρD,+∞)2. After
computation, we can verify that the unique solution of the system is τN(0) = τS(0) =
τX = (βρD/(1− α))φ−(1−α)/βLYN/LS + ρD > ρD (see Figure 2).
The results of e), f) and g) above give Proposition 6 and characterize the curves of Figure
2.
h) Let us compute the best response function of the South government. From (C.11),
we can write CS(0) = (1 − α)YS(0) + γρDYN(0)/τN(0). Hence, ∂CS(0)/∂τS(0) = (1 −
α)∂YS(0)/∂τS(0) + (γρD/τN(0))∂YN(0)/∂τS(0).
Using again the variable χ, we find that ∂YN(0)/∂τS(0) = (γ/β)(YN(0)/τS(0))χ/(1 +
χ) and ∂YS(0)/∂τS(0) = −(γ/β)(YS(0)/τS(0))χ−1/(1 + χ−1). Substituting these later
results in the expression of ∂CS(0)/∂τS(0) above, we immediately have that
∂CS(0)/∂τS(0) > (resp <)0 ⇐⇒ −(1 − α)(γ/β)(YS(0)/τS(0))χ−1/(1 + χ−1) < (resp >
)(γρD/τN(0))(γ/β)(YN(0)/τS(0))χ/(1+χ). Multiplying both sides of the later inequality
by τS(0)(1 + χ)β/γ and rearranging, we get ∂CS(0)/∂τS(0) > (resp <)0
⇐⇒ χ−1τN(0)YS(0)/YN(0) < (resp >)γρD/(1 − α). Recalling now from (C.1) that
YS(0)/YN(0) = χτS(0)/τN(0), we obtain: ∂CS(0)/∂τS(0) > (resp <)0 ⇐⇒ τS(0) <
(resp >)γρD/(1− α).
By continuity, it appears that CS(0) is maximum in τS(0) when τS(0) = γρD/(1−α).
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i) Let us compute the best response function of the North government. From e)ı) above,
the tax level maximizing CN(0) is larger than ρD, for any τS(0) > 0. Then, from e)ıı),
the tax level τN(0) = τ̂N(τS(0)) maximizes CN(0).
j) Recalling that the initial tax levels have no effect on the dynamics of the economy,
the initial tax level τi(0) maximizing Ci(0) is also the one maximizing Ci(t) at all dates
t ≥ 0, for any i = N,S. Moreover, looking at the utility functions of both representative
agents in (2.10) and recalling that the tax levels do not affect the law of motion of E,
note that it is equivalent for government i to maximize Ui and to maximize consumption
in country i at all dates, i = N,S.
k) The Nash equilibrium of the game on the initial tax levels is at the intersection of
both best response functions. That of the South is τS(0) = γρD/(1− α) that also writes
τS(0) = ρD−βρD/(1−α), which is lower than ρD. Recalling that the vertical asymptote
of CSmax is τS(0) = ρD, this implies that the Nash equilibrium is on CNmax, below the
asymptote.
Eventually, h), i), j) and k) give the best response of both governments and the Nash
outcome of the game proposed in Subsection 4.3.
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